

CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION

SUMMARY DECISION UNDER REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE SECTION 40

In the Matter of the Petition for
Reassessment of the 2023 Unitary Value for:

**SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
COMPANY (0148)**

Petitioner

Appeal No.: SAU 23-010

Oral Hearing Date:
December 12, 2023¹

Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioners:

Mardiros H. Dakessian, Attorney
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Charles Moll, Attorney
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For the Respondent:

Richard Moon, Attorney V
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Appeals Attorney:

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VALUES AT ISSUE

	<u>Value</u>	<u>Penalty</u>	<u>Total</u>
2023 Board-Adopted Unitary Value	\$36,207,700,000	\$0	\$36,207,700,000
Petitioner's Requested Unitary Value	\$29,033,300,000	\$0	\$29,033,300,000
Respondent's Appeal Recommendation	\$36,207,700,000	\$0	\$36,207,700,000
Board Determined Value	\$36,207,700,000	\$0	\$36,207,700,000

¹ At the oral hearing, the Board denied the petition as to all issues, by a 4-1 vote of the Members, with Chair Vazquez, Vice-Chair Lieber, Member Schaefer, and Controller Cohen voting aye, and Member Gaines voting no.

Factual Background

1 Southern California Edison Company (SCE or Petitioner), a wholly owned subsidiary of
2 Edison International, is a public utility subject to rate regulation by the California Public Utilities
3 Commission (Commission or CPUC). SCE is primarily engaged in the business of supplying electric
4 energy in central, coastal, and southern California, excluding the City of Los Angeles and certain other
5 cities. Petitioner's service area encompasses 50,000 square miles, which includes 103,000 miles of
6 distribution and transmission lines, serving a population of approximately 15 million people.
7

8 The CPUC establishes rates for utilities under its jurisdiction in a rate-setting procedure called
9 the General Rate Case (GRC).² In establishing rates for utilities, the CPUC considers the utilities' rate
10 base. Rate base is the value of property on which a public utility is permitted by the Commission to
11 earn a specified rate of return. In general, the rate base consists of the cost of property as used by the
12 utility in providing service.

13 Petitioner's 2023 Board-adopted value of \$36,207,700,000 is based on 75 percent reliance on
14 the Historical Cost Less Book Depreciation (HCLD)³ value indicator (\$38,594,185,259) and 25
15 percent reliance on the Capitalized Earning Ability⁴ (CEA) value indicator (\$29,048,430,250).

16 On appeal, Petitioner contends that their 2023 Board-adopted unitary value is overstated and is
17 requesting a revised unitary value of \$29,033,273,468, or \$29,033,300,000 as rounded.

18 At the Appeals Conference, the parties did not reach agreement on any of the issues raised and
19 affirmed they were pursuing a full hearing before the Board.

General Concerns Raised by the Parties

20
21 Petitioner and the State-Assessed Properties Division (SAPD or Respondent) each discussed
22 general information relevant to the context of the five specific issues raised within their briefings and
23

24 ² The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure Article 2 and Appendix A of the Commission decision (D07-07-004)
25 set the rules and procedures for GRC review process.

26 ³ The HCLD value indicator is a form of the cost approach to value. The Historical Cost Less Depreciation (HCLD) value
27 indicator derivation includes the historical or original acquisition cost of all property less nontaxable items and property
28 assessed elsewhere. This results in the taxable historical cost. The taxable historical cost is then reduced for the assessee's
regulatory accounting depreciation of the taxable property. This results in the assessable HCLD. The value of any
possessory interest and/or noncapitalized leased properties are added to arrive at the final HCLD value indicator. HCLD is
one of the more important indicators of value for closely regulated public utilities. See Cal. Bd. Of Equaliz. *Unitary
Valuation Methods (UVM)* (2003), pp. 1-4.

⁴ The CEA value indicator is a form of the income approach to value. The income approach to value may be generally
described as any method that converts future anticipated income into present value. The conversion process is commonly
known as income capitalization. See Cal. Bd. Of Equaliz. *UVM*, (2003), pp. 35-37.

1 at the Oral Hearing; this included information related to SCE’s past, current, and future financial and
2 economic situation; with the risks associated with wildfires; the context of the Board’s valuation; and
3 the state of the regulated electric generation industry as a whole. The specific issues Petitioner raised
4 with its 2023 Board-Adopted value are addressed under Legal Issues 1 through 5, while a summary,
5 analysis and disposition of the general contentions is provided first to establish the factual context of
6 the Board’s disposition of this Petition.

7 As a prefatory matter, each party provided remarks on the overall reasonableness of SCE’s
8 2023 Board-adopted unitary value. Petitioner contends that the mere magnitude of the \$9.5 billion
9 discrepancy between the HCLD and CEA value indicators is unacceptable from an appraisal
10 standpoint, which in short, allegedly supports their general claim that SAPD’s appraisal is unlawful
11 and improper. However, Respondent notes that Petitioner had \$3 billion of asset additions this year,
12 which is less than the total unitary value increase from the 2022 to 2023 assessment year
13 (approximately \$1.9 billion).⁵

14 Petitioner raises four general concerns, asserting these are the various business risks and other
15 factors affecting SCE’s 2023 unitary value: 1) the context of increasing catastrophic wildfires in
16 California; 2) California’s use of “inverse condemnation⁶” which “imposes strict liability...based on
17 the presumption that a utility has the ability and is the appropriate agency to recover such costs from
18 customers” and uncertainty as to whether the CPUC will allow liability to be recovered in the rate base
19 even if the utility acts prudently⁷; 3) the challenges and cost prohibitive nature of obtaining insurance
20 coverage due to wildfire risk arising from its ordinary operations, as well as recent impacts to the
21 California homeowner insurance market; 4) Wildfire Mitigation Plans and the Wildfire Insurance
22 Fund, including specifically California’s Senate Bill (SB) 901⁸ (Ch. 626, Stats. 2018) and the Wildfire
23

24 ⁵ Respondent notes the approximately \$2.4 billion in additions is net of retirements and exclusive of approximately \$2.3
25 billion in construction work in progress (CWIP). (See Appraisal Data Report.)

26 ⁶ Inverse condemnation is a legal concept that entitles property owners to just compensation if their property is damaged by
27 a public use. This liability rule applies to all government agencies, as well as utilities. After a wildfire, inverse
28 condemnation is the way that victims of fires (residents, businesses, and local agencies) recover their costs. See League of
California Cities “Inverse Condemnation Fact Sheet” <https://www.counties.org/post/inverse-condemnation-fact-sheet>.

⁷ Petitioner cites 2017 CPUC ruling for San Diego Gas & Electric company (SDG&E), which held SDG&E liable for
damages due to finding SDG&E had not taken reasonable actions prior to 2007 and thus not properly invoked inverse
condemnation to allow cost sharing through utility rates. (CPUC, App. No. 15-09-010 and Decision 17-11-033.)

⁸ SB 901 established, among other provisions, CPUC’s reasonableness review of utility activities to determine whether, or
not, cost recovery through the rate base is allowable when the wildfire is caused by the utility’s equipment, without altering
California’s application of inverse condemnation.

1 Insurance Fund created by Assembly Bill (AB) 1054⁹ (Ch. 79, Stats 2019), which statutorily required
2 Petitioner to make an initial contribution of \$2.4 billion, and 10 annual contributions of \$95 million
3 each, and Petitioner's statutory requirement to maintain reasonable insurance coverage, which must be
4 exhausted prior to Wildfire Insurance Fund reimbursement becoming available to Petitioner.¹⁰

5 However, Respondent notes that the broad risks Petitioner cited do not acknowledge the
6 adjustments already included within Petitioner's 2023 unitary value, which total approximately \$2.6
7 billion. Respondent highlights four specific adjustments which have already been included in SCE's
8 2023 Board-adopted value:

- 9 • AB 1054 requires SCE to pay an additional \$95 million per year for 10 years
10 into the wildfire fund. Staff has made an adjustment to account for this requirement
11 which resulted in an approximately \$126 million value reduction.
- 12 • SCE has requested a .85% wildfire risk premium be added to its capitalization
13 rate. Staff has made an adjustment to account for this request, which resulted in an
14 approximately \$445 million value reduction.
- 15 • AB 1054 requires SCE to make \$1.6 billion in capital expenditures over a three
16 year period for fire risk mitigation purposes. The assembly bill precludes SCE from
17 earning an equity return on these capital expenditures. As of the 2023 lien date, SCE
18 has made all \$1.6 billion in capital expenditures for this purpose. Staff has made an
19 adjustment to account for SCE's inability to earn an equity return on these
20 expenditures, which resulted in an approximately \$505 million value reduction.
- 21 • Staff made an obsolescence adjustment to the HCLD indicator to acknowledge
22 additional obsolescence resulting from the .85% equity risk premium addition to the
23 capitalization rate. This adjustment resulted in an approximately \$1.6 billion value
24 reduction.

21 (See Appraisal Data Report and Narrative.)

22 Then, Respondent contends, these, among other arguments regarding a general increase in
23 business risk due to wildfires, are the same arguments Petitioner made—and the Board rejected—for
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27 ⁹ Assembly Bill 1054 (Ch. 79, Stats. 2019) (AB 1054) created a \$21 billion fund funded by contributions from investor-
28 owned utilities, including Petitioner, and from ratepayers. This fund is available to pay certain wildfire claims made against
Petitioner.

¹⁰ Petitioner also notes that maintaining \$1 billion of insurance coverage has become increasingly expensive, citing \$450
million in costs for FY 2022-2023, and estimates that cost increasing, which questions their ability to obtain a reasonable
amount of wildfire insurance, at a reasonable cost.

1 the last three years.¹¹ Further, Respondent notes these are also the same arguments the CPUC rejected
2 in SCE's request for a wildfire risk premium adjustment to increase the return on equity¹² (ROE)
3 allowed in 2019. (CPUC Decision 19-12-056 (Dec. 19, 2019), pp. 40-41.) In the CPUC case,¹³ the
4 CPUC stated:

5 After considering the evidence on market conditions, trends, creditworthiness, interest rate
6 forecasts, quantitative financial models, additional risk factors including business risk [which
7 includes wildfire risk], and interest coverage presented by the parties and applying our
8 informed judgment ... We find that SCE's authorized test year 2020 ROE should be 10.30%.
9 This ROE is reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility
and to maintain investment grade credit ratings while balancing the interests between
shareholders and ratepayers.¹⁴

10 Further, Respondent notes that CPUC's final conclusion was that "We find that the passage of AB
11 1054 and other investor supportive polices in California have mitigated wildfire exposure faced by
12 California's utilities." (CPUC Decision 19-12-056, at p. 37.) The CPUC also stated, "[b]ased on the
13 above financial, business, and regulatory risks discussion, we conclude the ROE ranges adopted in the
14 proceedings...adequately compensate the utilities for these risks." (*Id.*, at p. 40.) Respondent notes that
15 Petitioner also recognized its significant reduction of risk of liability, as Petitioner voluntarily
16 significantly reduced its ROE increase request in the CPUC case following the passage of AB 1054
17 from 6 percent to .85 percent, which was also ultimately rejected by the CPUC. (CPUC Decision 19-
18 12-056, at p. 28.)

19 In addition, Respondent notes that similar to SCE's 2022 unitary value, and even though the
20 CPUC denied Petitioner's increased ROE request based on its conclusion that mitigation measures and
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22
23 ¹¹ California State Board of Equalization, Appeal SAU 20-015, decided December 16, 2020, Appeal SAU 21-007, decided
24 December 14, 2021, and SAU 22-006, decided December 13, 2022. We note each of these three prior petition years is
being contested by Petitioner in superior court. However, the instant petition was decided de novo based on the record
submitted.

25 ¹² A utility's Rate of Return, or Cost of Capital, is the weighted average cost of debt, preferred equity, and common stock,
26 a utility has issued to finance its investments. Return on Equity (ROE) is the return to common equity. The CPUC
attempts to set the authorized ROE at a level that is adequate to enable the utility to attract investors to finance
27 the replacement and expansion of its facilities so it can fulfill its public utility service obligation. In practice, this level is
determined by estimating market returns on investments for other companies with similar levels of risk. In general, a
higher ROE allows greater earnings and would be appropriate to reflect increased risks and uncertainties. See generally:
28 <<https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-costs/cost-of-capital>> and
<<https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-costs/historical-electric-cost-data/rate-of-return>>
[As of Nov. 20, 2023.]

¹³ California Public Utilities Commission Decision 19-12-056 (D1912056) (Dec. 19, 2019), p. 28 available at
<<https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/DecisionsSearchForm.aspx>> [as of Nov. 17, 2023].

¹⁴ *Id.* at pp. 40-41.

1 AB 1054 had sufficiently addressed wildfire risk, SAPD has again allowed an increased equity risk
2 premium of .85 percent to Petitioner's 2023 overall capitalization rate. This equity risk premium
3 resulted in an approximately \$1.6 billion value reduction, which was allowed to acknowledge risk that
4 might not be captured in the other adjustments allowed for the Petitioner.

5 Further, Respondent notes that Fitch Ratings, one of the three major credit rating agencies,
6 upgraded Petitioner's long-term issuer credit ratings from 'BBB-/Outlook Positive' to 'BBB'/Outlook
7 Stable.¹⁵

8 Petitioner contends that despite SAPD's claims of multiple and generous adjustments that the
9 Board should not conflate the wildfire risk premium adjustment discussion with the specific issues
10 raised in SCE's petition (discussed *infra*, at Legal Issues 1-5). Petitioner further argues that
11 Respondent incorrectly negated the mentioned adjustment to account for SCE's inability to earn an
12 equity return on the wildfire mitigation capital expenditures, by erroneously increasing the cost
13 indicator by \$788 million through an AB 1054 securitization cost addback, which resulted in a net
14 increase in assessed value. Additionally, they note that while Petitioner's credit rating has increased,
15 the significance of the increase is misleading as BBB is still within the lowest tier of investment grade.

16 Applicable Law and Appraisal Principles

17 Burden of Proof

18 Assessing officers are presumed to have properly performed their duties. (Evid. Code, § 664.)
19 Therefore, Petitioner has the burden of showing that the assessment is incorrect or illegal. (*ITT World*
20 *Communications v. Santa Clara* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 246; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 5541,
21 subd. (a).)

22 Analysis and Disposition of General Contentions

23 Respondent is presumed to have correctly determined the value of the property at issue and
24 Petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise. Here, Petitioner contends that the mere magnitude of
25 the \$9.5 billion discrepancy between the HCLD and CEA value indicators is unacceptable from an
26 appraisal standpoint, which therefore proves economic and other uncertainties were not fully
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28 _____
¹⁵ Fitch Ratings, Fitch Upgrades Edison International's & So. Cal. Ed's IDRs to 'BBB'; Outlook Stable (April 28, 2023)
<[Fitch Upgrades Edison International's & So. Cal. Ed's IDRs to 'BBB'; Outlook Stable \(fitchratings.com\)](https://www.fitchratings.com)> (as of October 2,
2023.)

1 considered by the Board and supports their claim that SAPD's appraisal is unlawful and improper.
2 Additionally, Petitioner asserts the existence of additional business risk from wildfires was not fully
3 reflected in the Board adopted value. However, Respondent contends risk is only one of many factors
4 that affects appraisal and that the cited risks and conditions have already been adjusted for, as reflected
5 in the 2023 appraisal narrative. Further, Respondent points out that Petitioner's 2022 calendar year
6 asset additions support the year over year valuation increase. While Respondent raises Petitioner's
7 prior CPUC proceeding as evidence that such risk was viewed as adequately captured in the rate base,
8 we note that such a finding has relevance to the instant proceeding, particularly as it relates to the
9 determination of the rate base utilized by Respondent in the development of the HCLD value indicator;
10 however, we also note that Petitioner's specific factual contentions and legal issues have been fully
11 considered by the Board, herein, as a case of first impression.

12 While these general risks and factors are relevant to the context of this appeal, we find that no
13 general concern raised proves *ipso facto* that Respondent erred in the calculation of SCE's 2023
14 Board-adopted unitary value. Further, we also find that to the extent Petitioner introduced these facts
15 and contentions to provide context to the specific legal issues raised in this petition, Petitioner bears
16 the burden of proof to show error within Respondent's calculation of the 2023 Board-adopted unitary
17 value with regard to each specific legal issue raised before the Board.

18
19 **Legal Issues 1 and 2: Whether Petitioner Has Shown that Respondent Has Failed to Reconcile the**
20 **Historical Cost Less Depreciation (HCLD) Value Indicator and the Capitalized Earning Ability**
21 **(CEA) Indicator of Value and/or Otherwise Erred in Placing 75 Percent Reliance on the HCLD**
22 **Value Indicator and 25 Percent Reliance on the CEA Indicator of Value.**

23 **Findings of Fact and Related Contentions**

24 Based on the two contentions described below, Petitioner requests that the Board revise its
25 2023 unitary value by placing 25 percent reliance on the HCLD value indicator and 75 percent reliance
26 on the CEA value indicator, as this is more reliable, in its opinion, than utilizing Respondent's
27 reconciliation of the two value indicators.

28 /

1 First, Petitioner asserts Respondent's appraisal is flawed as the two value approaches utilized
2 produced widely varying results. Petitioner alleges that due to this disparity, and as Respondent's
3 analysis does not explicitly state the value approaches were reconciled, Respondent must have decided
4 to simply weigh the HCLD value indicator as 75 percent and the CEA value indicator 25 percent,
5 without any reconciliation or reason for doing so in an analytical manner based on verified market
6 data, which, in Petitioner's opinion, is contrary to the guidance within Assessors' Handbook (AH),
7 section 501, *Basic Appraisal* (AH 501). Petitioner also asserts that the disparity in value indicators
8 signals the existence of substantial obsolescence or impairment, as AH 502, *Advanced Appraisal*,
9 warns is possible.

10 Second, Petitioner asserts Respondent has improperly weighted the HCLD value indicator as
11 75 percent and the CEA approach at 25 percent. Petitioner asserts that Respondent arbitrarily weighted
12 the value indicators, which is underscored by the admission that it is the same reliance used to value
13 Petitioner's property in each of the past 10 years, despite recent changes in circumstances and
14 increasing risks and costs related to the ownership of Petitioner's property. Petitioner recommends that
15 the Board instead weigh the two value indicators as 75 percent income approach and 25 percent cost
16 approach.

17 Petitioner further asserts that Property Tax Rule¹⁶ 8 indicates the income approach must be
18 granted additional weight. Petitioner asserts that the rate base determined by the CPUC is intended to
19 achieve a fair balance between what ratepayers bear and what utility shareholders earn, and not to
20 establish the fair market value of the utility's property. Petitioner further argues that the HCLD
21 indicator calculated by SAPD is unreliable when Respondent includes assets not included in the rate
22 base and does not recognize impairments due to regulatory restrictions placed on certain assets (i.e.,
23 the inability to earn a return), and as such, additional reliance placed on the income indicator would
24 capture the economic impairment due to wildfire risks and increased regulatory restrictions. Petitioner
25 cites that the Ernst & Young, LLP (EY) report¹⁷ it commissioned in the SAU 20-015 appeal for lien
26

27 ¹⁶ All references to "Property Tax Rule" or "Rule(s)" are to sections of title 18 of the California Code of Regulations.

28 ¹⁷ Petitioner has included a draft copy of the Ernst & Young, LLP (EY) Valuation Analysis, November 9, 2020 (EY Report) as Petition, Appendix B). However, it should be noted this report was prepared for lien date 2020, not lien date 2023, i.e. the subject of this appeal; thus, while referenced, the EY report is not an appraisal for the lien date at issue. Further, the EY report does not publish any conclusion as to what it believed to be the proper weighting, nor is this attached report the finalized copy.

1 date 2020, supports this view and reconciles the two approaches appropriately, in its opinion, and
2 considers Petitioner's perceived flaws with Respondent's approach.

3 Petitioner further contends that Respondent acknowledges a limited understanding of
4 "regulatory lag"¹⁸ but continues to argue that the CEA indicator should be given less reliance in
5 Petitioner's overall value, contrary to Rule 8 in Petitioner's opinion.

6 Petitioner asserts the changes that have taken place during the last 10 years in terms of wildfires
7 and shifts in the business environment and regulatory restrictions, coupled with Respondent's failure to
8 reconcile the \$9.5 billion difference in the HCLD and CEA approaches have rendered Respondent's
9 appraisal completely disconnected from what a willing buyer would pay.

10 In its reply, Petitioner asserts that its argument that the difference between the two value
11 indicators is attributable to economic obsolescence is supported by AH 502, *Advanced Appraisal*,
12 which states a "CEA indicator which is much lower than HCLD may indicate that obsolescence exists
13 in the property." Additionally, Petitioner reasserts that Respondent has not reconciled the indicators in
14 an analytical manner and is distracting from that failure by requesting Petitioner "provide a
15 reconciliation of value indicators in an analytical manner" based on a "reasoned and defensible opinion
16 of verified market data". Petitioner concludes by reasserting SAPD's duty is to reconcile the indicators,
17 and the difference between the two approaches suggests Respondent has not addressed all economic
18 and functional obsolescence.

19 Respondent has conducted its appraisal by calculating and reconciling the HCLD and CEA
20 value indicators, consistent with relevant law and appraisal guidance.¹⁹ Respondent notes significant
21 differences in the two value approaches can and may occur, as stated in Assessors' Handbook, section
22 501 (AH 501) *Basic Appraisal*, without compromising the validity of the underlying value approach,
23 quoting:

24 The reconciliation of value indicators from the separate approaches to value and the
25 resulting final value estimate is the next step in the appraisal process. *Theoretically*, the
26 approaches to value should produce identical value indicators. *In practice, however,*
27 *this is rarely the case, and significant differences may occur.* To produce a final value
28 estimate, the appraiser reconciles the indicators from each approach utilized. Value

¹⁸ Regulatory lag is the time delay between a utility's costs and any adjustment CPUC may make to the rate base to account for these costs. This process creates a lag between the time the assets are placed in service and the time the company begins to get a recover of and recovery on the assets.

¹⁹ Assessing officers are presumed to have properly performed their duties. (Evid. Code, § 664.)

1 indicators should be reconciled considering: (1) the appropriateness of the approach
2 given the purpose of the appraisal; and (2) the adequacy and reliability of the data
3 available to perform the appraisal. The appraiser should examine and reconcile all
value indicators.

4 (AH 501, p. 62, emphases added.) Specifically, Respondent notes that when analyzing and reconciling
5 value indicators to arrive at a final value estimate, the criteria described in AH 502 should be
6 considered:

7 The final value estimate is an appraiser's *opinion of value*. There is no mathematical formula or
8 statistical technique to which the appraiser can ultimately refer in order to reach the final value
9 estimate. It is an opinion that should be based on the appraiser's application of generally
10 accepted appraisal methods and procedures. It is generally inappropriate to use the arithmetic
11 mean of the value indicators as the final value estimate. Simply calculating an average implies
12 that all the value indicators have equal validity. While this may occur in certain instances, it is
usually not the case. Appraisers must follow Rule 3, noted above, and consider the
appropriateness of the value approaches, the relative accuracy of the value indicators, and the
quantity and quality of the data available when reconciling value indicators to reach the final
value estimate.

13 (citing AH 502, p. 111; Emphasis added by Respondent.)

14 Respondent notes the HCLD approach is a reliable indicator of market value for closely
15 regulated public utilities like Petitioner, as HCLD, with some modification, approximates the rate base
16 that regulators use in establishing revenue requirements. (citing *Unitary Valuation Methods (UVM)*
17 (2003), p. 1.) HCLD reflects the market value contribution of all taxable property including the
18 depreciated historical cost of plant in service, possessory interests, construction work in progress, and
19 materials and supplies, and is:

20 A generally accepted method for valuing property interests of rate base regulated utilities,
21 whether centrally or locally assessed, is by use of the historical cost approach. Certain
22 industries have been and continue to be subject to rate base regulation, as a result of which
23 authorized earnings, or rates of return, are set by regulators and measured by rate base. Under
24 Rule 3(d), the assessing agency shall consider as relevant to value the amount actually invested
25 in the property or the amount invested less depreciation, if the income from the property is
26 regulated by law and the regulatory agency uses historical cost, historical cost less depreciation
27 (HCLD), or trended original cost as a rate base. Thus, the historical cost approach is considered
28 relevant for estimating the market value of public utility properties depending upon regulatory
influences.

(AH 502, p. 146.) Further, HCLD is,

one of the more important indicators of value for closely regulated public utilities. The
general practice of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and most other
regulatory agencies is to use historical or original cost less depreciation (with various
adjustments) as the rate base. The regulatory agencies establish a rate base and a rate of

1 return; utilities are permitted to earn at this established rate on the rate base.

2 (*UVM*, p. 1. Emphasis added.)

3 Respondent also notes that Property Tax Rule 8, subdivision (a), indicates the CEA value
4 indicator is appropriate to use when the property has “an established income stream...,” and here,
5 Petitioner has an established income stream.

6 Respondent states that consistent with the relevant HCLD and CEA value indicator authorities
7 and considerations, and Petitioner being a utility, rate regulated by the CPUC, Respondent considered
8 HCLD to be the most reliable indicator of value, placing 75 percent reliance on the indicator.
9 Respondent notes that due to Petitioner’s significant growth in actual and planned capital expenditures
10 to replace and expand distribution and transmission infrastructure, and to construct and replace
11 generation assets, Petitioner is experiencing “regulatory lag.” Accordingly, in Respondent’s opinion, it
12 is appropriate to weight the CEA value indicator 25 percent to account for regulatory lag in rate
13 adjustment for items on which Petitioner is not currently earning a return.

14 Respondent also notes the 75/25 percent reliance on HCLD and CEA respectively is the same
15 reliance used by SAPD to value Petitioner’s property in each of the past 12 years, as well as the same
16 reliance Respondent places on the value indicators of other investor-owned, rate-regulated utilities.
17 (*Ibid.*) Respondent contends, while Petitioner sees this consistency as a flaw or indication that changes
18 have not been reflected related to the climate, utility industry, and to Petitioner specifically,
19 Respondent asserts Petitioner ignores the fact that a change in weighting is not the sole method by
20 which significant value adjustments can be made to reflect such factors, such as the approximately
21 \$2.6 billion downward adjustment Respondent has already made to account for wildfire risk.

22 Respondent also notes that Petitioner’s assertion that the difference between the HCLD and
23 CEA methods is entirely attributable to economic obsolescence is wholly unsubstantiated. Further,
24 Respondent notes it is unclear how Petitioner arrived at its requested weighting of the CEA and HCLD
25 indicators. Respondent points out that in 2020, Petitioner requested 50 percent weighting of the CEA
26 value indicator in its original petition. Then in 2021, Petitioner requested a 35 percent weighting of the
27 CEA value indicator based on the same arguments, with no explanation for the change. In 2022 and
28 now 2023, Petitioner requests a 75 percent weighting of the CEA value indicator based on the same

1 arguments and presumptive risk analysis developed in 2020, without explanation for the change.
2 Respondent concludes while Petitioner criticizes SAPD's reasoning, Petitioner has not provided a basis
3 for the reconciliation of the value indicators it requests in this petition in an "analytical manner" that is
4 based on a "reasoned and defensible opinion of verified market data". (AH 502, p. 62.)

5 Applicable Law and Appraisal Principles

6 Burden of Proof

7 Assessing officers are presumed to have properly performed their duties. (Evid. Code, § 664.)
8 Therefore, Petitioner has the burden of showing that the assessment is incorrect or illegal. (*ITT World*
9 *Communications v. Santa Clara* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 246; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 5541,
10 subd. (a).)

11 Value Standard

12 Property Tax Rule 2, subdivision (a) states that "in addition to the meaning ascribed to them in
13 the Revenue and Taxation Code, the words "full value," "full cash value," "cash value," "actual
14 value," and "fair market value" mean the price at which a property, if exposed for sale in the open
15 market with a reasonable time for the seller to find a purchaser, would transfer for cash or its
16 equivalent under prevailing market conditions between parties who have knowledge of the uses to
17 which the property may be put, both seeking to maximize their gains and neither being in a position to
18 take advantage of the exigencies of the other."

19 HCLD Approach to Value

20 Property Tax Rule 3, subdivision (d) provides the HCLD approach to value shall be
21 considered "[i]f the income from the property is regulated by law and the regulatory agency uses
22 historical cost or historical cost less depreciation as the rate base, the amount invested in the property
23 or the amount invested less depreciation computed by the method employed by the regulatory
24 agency." HCLD, with some modification, approximates the rate base that regulators use in
25 establishing revenue requirements. (See *UVM*, p. 1.) HCLD reflects the market value contribution of
26 all taxable property including the depreciated historical cost of plant in service, possessory interests,
27 construction work in progress, and materials and supplies. (AH 502, p. 146.) HCLD is,

28 one of the more important indicators of value for closely regulated public utilities. The general
practice of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and most other regulatory
agencies is to use historical or original cost less depreciation (with various adjustments) as the

1 rate base. The regulatory agencies establish a rate base and a rate of return; utilities are
2 permitted to earn at this established rate on the rate base.

3 (UVM (2003), p. 1.) Further, Board guidance states,

4 Appraisal depreciation in the form of obsolescence may be present in utility property and
5 deducted from HCLD. Such deductions may be proper when the utility's economic income
6 has been impaired and the rate or tariff-setting regulators have recognized such impairment.

7 (UVM, p. 1.)

Depreciation and the Cost Approach

8 In general, the cost approach recognizes three types of depreciation: physical deterioration,
9 functional obsolescence, and external, or economic, obsolescence, through the application of the
10 Board's replacement cost new trend factors and "percent" good factors. Obsolescence may occur when
11 property is outmoded (functional obsolescence) or when some event has substantially diminished the
12 future earning power of the property (economic obsolescence). (See Assessors' Handbook section 501,
13 *Basic Appraisal* (January 2002), pp. 80-83.) Functional obsolescence is the loss of value in a property
14 caused by the property's loss of capacity to perform the function for which it was intended. (*Id.* at p.
15 81.) Economic obsolescence is the diminished utility of a property due to adverse factors external to
16 the property being appraised and is incurable by the property owner. (*Id.* at p. 82.) The existence of any
17 additional or extraordinary obsolescence must be supported with verifiable documentation and
18 evidence, consistent with Board Guidelines. (See Property Tax Rule 6, subds. (d) & (e); Assessors'
19 Handbook section 502, *Advanced Appraisal* (Reprinted January 2015) (AH 502), pp. 20-21; *Unitary*
20 *Valuation Methods*, (2003), p. 30; and Cal. Bd. of Equalization, *Guidelines for Substantiating*
21 *Additional Obsolescence*, at p. 1.)

Income Approach to Value

23 Property Tax Rule 8, subdivision (a), states that "the income approach is used in conjunction
24 with other approaches when the property under appraisal is typically purchased in anticipation of a
25 money income and either has an established income stream or can be attributed a real or hypothetical
26 income stream by comparison with other properties." Subdivision (b) describes the income approach
27 to value as the valuation method whereby, "an appraiser values an income property by computing the
28 present worth of a future income stream. This present worth depends upon the size, shape, and

1 duration of the estimated stream and upon the capitalization rate at which future income is discounted
2 to its present worth.” Subdivision (c) provides that “the amount to be capitalized is the net return
3 which a reasonably well-informed owner and reasonably well-informed buyers may anticipate on the
4 valuation date that the taxable property existing on that date will yield under prudent management and
5 subject to legally enforceable restrictions as such persons may foresee as of that date.”

6 **Reconciliation of Value Indicators**

7 Property Tax Rule 3 requires that, in estimating value, the assessor shall consider one or more
8 of the approaches to value “as may be appropriate for the property being appraised,” which includes
9 the comparative sales approach, the cost approach (e.g., HCLD valuation methodology), or the
10 income approach (CEA valuation methodology). The appropriateness of an approach is often related
11 to the type of property being appraised and the available data. (AH 502, p. 109.) In addition, the
12 validity of a value indicator will depend upon the accuracy of data and adjustments made to the
13 approach. That is, the accuracy of a value indicator depends on the amount of available comparable
14 data, the number and type of adjustments, and the dollar amount of adjustments. Finally, if a large
15 amount of comparable data is available for a given approach, the appraiser may have more confidence
16 in that approach. For example, if income, expense, and capitalization rate data can be obtained from
17 many properties comparable to the subject, the appraiser may attribute significant accuracy to the
18 income approach. The greatest reliance should be placed on that approach or combination of
19 approaches that best measures the type of benefits the subject property yields. The final value estimate
20 reflects the relative weight that the appraiser assigned, either implicitly or explicitly, to each approach.
21 (AH 502, p. 112.)

22 **Analysis and Disposition**

23 Respondent is presumed to have correctly determined the value of the property at issue, and
24 Petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise. Here, Petitioner contends that because Respondent’s
25 calculated HCLD value indicator exceeds the CEA value indicator by \$9.5 billion, Respondent’s 2023
26 Board-adopted unitary value is flawed, as the various approaches to value must yield approximately
27 the same results, and differences of such a magnitude indicate that the value indicators were not
28 reconciled. Further, Petitioner contends Respondent did not reconcile the two value indicators, as
required by Property Tax Rule 3 and Board Guidance, and instead “simply states that the final value

1 estimate is an appraiser’s opinion of value.” However, as Board guidance and Respondent note,
2 significant differences may occur in validly calculated indicators. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that
3 the difference in the two valuation approaches must be due to economic or functional obsolescence,
4 but submits no evidence to substantiate this claim. While Petitioner advances various arguments,
5 Respondent maintains that in light of all available evidence, it was reasonable and appropriate to place
6 75 percent reliance on the HCLD value indicator, which reflects the consideration of many factors,
7 including: Petitioner’s “regulatory lag,” Petitioner’s established income stream, the relative reliance
8 placed on the value indicators of other rate-base regulated utilities, and consistency with Property Tax
9 Rules 3, 6, and 8, as well as relevant Board guidance.

10 Based on the evidence and arguments submitted, we find that Petitioner has not provided
11 specific evidence or argument to prove that its HCLD indicator is overstated, nor has Petitioner shown
12 that its CEA value indicator should be granted additional weight in the reconciliation of the value
13 indicators. Petitioner appears to be asserting the Board should adopt the appraisal judgment of the 2020
14 draft EY Report or, alternatively, adjust the weighting of the indicators pursuant to its request, without
15 putting forth any specific argument or evidence to support their request for additional weight to be
16 placed on the CEA value indicator, despite bearing the burden of proof to show error or illegality.
17 Finally, we note Petitioner’s assertion that the difference in the HCLD and CEA value indicators being
18 attributed to obsolescence is unsupported. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has not met their burden of
19 proof as to these issues.

20
21 **Legal Issue 3: Whether Petitioner Has Shown that Respondent Must Adjust the Board-Adopted**
22 **Value for SCE’s Accrual for Liabilities for the 2017/2018 Wildfires and Mudslides.**

23 **Findings of Fact and Related Contentions**

24 Petitioner asserts the 2023 Board-adopted value does not account for SCE’s accrual for
25 liabilities for the 2017/2018 wildfires and mudslides, erroneously disregarding costs for estimated
26 claims and settlements pre-AB 1054, just as Respondent has done in its 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022
27 assessments. Petitioner argues that Respondent has improperly made no adjustments to reflect the
28 expected losses in SCE’s unitary assessments, despite valuation of a going concern requiring

1 consideration of forecasted future expenses, as a potential buyer would become responsible for those
2 liabilities and factor those obligations into the purchase price. On this basis, Petitioner requests an
3 adjustment of \$858 million from both the HCLD and CEA values to account for these operating
4 expenses above and beyond insurance recoveries.

5 Petitioner asserts that Respondent ignores Petitioner's wildfire-related expenses as past
6 expenses that are not anticipated to be incurred again in the future. Petitioner refutes this by stating
7 that its request for an adjustment of \$858 million represents quantifiable operating expenses which
8 negatively impact the going concern value of its property, rather than a contractual or financing
9 liability. Petitioner contends such expenses are ordinary and necessary parts of SCE's operation as a
10 going concern, and even if they were not ordinary in the "new normal" of year-round wildfires in
11 California, Respondent does not provide citation to support excluding a non-ordinary expense that is
12 anticipated in the future.²⁰ Petitioner further asserts that Rule 8 and AH 502 require the inclusion of
13 anticipated income and operating expenses, and that Respondent cites no authority to exclude a non-
14 ordinary expense that is anticipated in the future.

15 Petitioner does not dispute that the liabilities at issue stem from 2017 and 2018 events, but
16 asserts that SAPD is wrong in stating that these claims and settlements will neither continue to
17 increase, nor be paid in the foreseeable future. As of December 31, 2021, SCE claims to have incurred
18 total net liability of \$858 million additional losses related to these events of \$1.3 billion. Additionally,
19 Petitioner notes that AB 1054's remedies do not address the losses/settlements related to the 2017 and
20 2018 Wildfire/Mudslide events, as it only covers wildfires occurring on or after July 2019. Thus,
21 Petitioner reasserts that while the initial liability stems from past events, that does not change that it is
22 resulting in ongoing expenses to SCE as claims are settled and paid, and such expenses would be
23 considered by any willing buyer, and thus, must be allowed.

24 Respondent notes Petitioner claims that SAPD has erroneously disregarded \$858 million of
25 accrued liability related to "Wildfire-related claims" dating back to 2017 and 2018, and requests that
26

27
28 ²⁰ In support, Petitioner cites a general statement from AH 502 to support this position. AH 502, p. 67 states, "Cost trends relating to the components of operating expenses should be studied to estimate the future level of operating expenses." Petitioner asserts such costs are anticipated to continue in the future, but does not address the likelihood of such claims in the context of AB 1054, which is designed to reduce the likelihood of such expenses if and until the wildfire mitigation fund is exhausted.

1 adjustments be made to both the HCLD and CEA value indicators because a knowledgeable buyer
2 would take these liabilities into account when valuing those assets. In general, Respondent notes that
3 it is unclear, however, why these liabilities, which arguably reduce the value of Petitioner's *business*
4 as a going concern, necessarily result in a reduction to the value of its *property* as a going concern or
5 its taxable unitary value, nor why Petitioner equates the valuation of its *property* as a going concern
6 with the value of its *business* as a going concern, as none of the authorities Petitioner cites supports
7 that proposition.

8 Respondent notes that consistent with the California Constitution Article XIII, section 1, the
9 standard of value is fair market value. Further, for state-assessed properties, the California Supreme
10 Court has stated:

11 From our review of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, we conclude that unit
12 taxation is properly characterized not as the taxation of real property or personal property or
13 even a combination of both, but rather as the taxation of *property as a going concern*. First,
14 what the Board assesses is the value of the public utility *property* as a going concern; it
15 considers the earnings of the *property* as a whole, and does not consider, less still assess, the
16 value of any single real or personal asset.

17 (*ITT, supra*, (1985) 37 Cal.3d at 864-865, emphases added by Respondent.) Respondent notes this is
18 explained for purposes of California property tax purposes by AH 502 as follows:

19 "Going concern value" is a term that has been used in a variety of contexts, and more
20 than one definition of the term can be found in the appraisal literature. Also, there are
21 different meanings for California property tax purposes and more than one meaning even
22 within California property tax law.

23 ¶ ... ¶

24 Outside the property tax arena, going concern appraisals are commonly conducted for
25 hotels and motels, restaurants, bowling alleys, industrial enterprises, shopping centers,
26 retail stores, and similar business operations using real property. Generally, the real
27 property is considered an integral part of the business operation. Without an allocation
28 among the various elements contributing value to the business operation, however, *such*
an appraisal is not appropriate for California property tax purposes....

Where the unit principle of valuation is used, it has been said that the assessable property
is valued as a going concern. *This means only that the taxable property of the business*
should be valued as if put to beneficial or productive use. It does not mean that the entire
value of the business can be assessed or that the going concern value is assessable.

(AH 502, p. 157, emphases added by Respondent.) Accordingly, Respondent notes their appraised

1 value reflects the total market value of all taxable *property* as a unit owned or used by Petitioner, not
2 the “firm value,” which can be thought of as an estimate of the price a potential buyer might be willing
3 to pay for the entire *business*. Respondent contends the entire business or firm value, by itself, is not
4 relevant to California unitary property taxation.

5 Respondent also remarks that this context is why the CPUC’s consideration of liabilities in
6 evaluating a proposed acquisition is irrelevant, because CPUC is instead evaluating the *entire business*.

7 Respondent goes on to note that Petitioner’s equating of “firm value” with the value of the
8 entire company, requiring a decline in the unitary value of taxable property when firm value declines,
9 is reasoning that ignores the fundamental difference between the value of “*the entire company*” and the
10 unitary value of “*the company’s taxable property*.” Instead, because Petitioner’s “Wildfire-related
11 claims” are for the settlement or potential settlements of litigation arising out of wildfires and
12 mudslides that occurred in 2017 and 2018, Respondent notes it does not reduce the value of
13 Petitioner’s taxable property, making a downward adjustment inappropriate.

14 Additionally, Respondent contends Petitioner’s request for the same deduction to be made to
15 the CEA value indicator is also not appropriate for the same reasons. Respondent notes the premise of
16 the CEA value indicator calculation is to convert (or capitalize) a *future* income stream into present
17 worth (Rule 8, subd. (a).), and the amount to be capitalized is,

18 the net return which a reasonably well informed owner and reasonably well informed buyers
19 may *anticipate* on the valuation date that the taxable property existing on that date will yield
20 under prudent management and subject to such legally enforceable restrictions as such persons
may foresee as of that date.

21 (Rule 8, subd. (c), emphasis added.) Thus, Respondent contends it is clear that neither past nor non-
22 ordinary expenses may be deducted from a future income stream to be capitalized. Accordingly, as
23 Respondent notes the costs for which Petitioner seeks a reduction are both past expenses and expenses
24 which are not anticipated to be incurred again in the future, Respondent concludes no adjustment for
25 these liabilities is appropriate.

26 Respondent also notes that Petitioner’s argument that wildfire liabilities should now be
27 considered ordinary expenses and that they will occur in the future, may or may not actually be true,
28 but regardless, it is only these particular liabilities from these past events that are at issue. Further,

1 Respondent notes it is undisputed that these particular liabilities are accrued for liability related to
2 claims that resulted from wildfires and mudslides in 2017 and 2018, all of which occurred in the past
3 and will not recur.

4 Finally, Respondent notes that while Petitioner appears to be arguing that since these past
5 liabilities will actually be paid at some time in the future, they are deductible when calculating the
6 CEA value indicator; however, Respondent notes the mere fact that they may be paid in the future does
7 not mean that such expenses qualify as deductible, ordinary expenses. Respondent also notes that to
8 the extent Petitioner is arguing that this type of wildfire liability lawsuit settlements will occur in the
9 future, Petitioner has stated a belief that much of that risk has been mitigated through AB 1054.

10 Applicable Law and Appraisal Principles

11 Burden of Proof

12 Assessing officers are presumed to have properly performed their duties. (Evid. Code, § 664.)
13 Therefore, Petitioner has the burden of showing that the assessment is incorrect or illegal. (*ITT World*
14 *Communications v. Santa Clara* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 246; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 5541,
15 subd. (a).)

16 Value Standard

17 See Issues 1 and 2, Applicable Law, p. 12.

18 Income Approach to Value

19 See Issues 1 and 2, Applicable Law, p. 13-14.

20 Subdivision (c) provides that “the amount to be capitalized is the net return which a reasonably
21 well-informed owner and reasonably well informed buyers may anticipate on the valuation date that
22 the taxable property existing on that date will yield under prudent management and subject to legally
23 enforceable restrictions as such persons may foresee as of that date.” Net return is the difference
24 between gross return and gross outgo. (Rule 8, subd. (c).) Amortization, depreciation, and debt
25 retirement are explicitly excluded from gross outgo. (*Ibid.*)

26 Analysis and Disposition

27 Respondent is presumed to have correctly determined the value of the property at issue, and
28 Petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise.

1 Here, Petitioner contends that Respondent's calculated unitary value inappropriately excludes
2 Petitioner's \$858 million in liabilities related to the 2017/2018 wildfires and mudslides, and requests a
3 corresponding reduction to each value indicator. Petitioner asserts such an adjustment is necessary as
4 the liabilities reduce its firm value, or going concern as a business, and certainly would be considered
5 by any prospective buyer or the CPUC in any proposed transaction. Further, Petitioner contends such
6 an adjustment to the CEA value indicator calculation is necessary as such expenses are ordinary and
7 reoccurring, as liabilities have continued to accrue in the current year related to the 2017/2018
8 Wildfires/Mudslides. Petitioner further contends Respondent misinterprets Property Tax Rules and
9 Assessors' Handbooks by denying Petitioner's requested adjustments to the HCLD and CEA value
10 indicators.

11 However, as Respondent points out, Petitioner has provided no specific argument, evidence, or
12 legal or appraisal authority to support its proposed deduction of the past and non-ordinary expenses
13 related to its pre-AB 1054 liabilities for property tax purposes. For purposes of the HCLD approach,
14 Petitioner does not provide evidence or authority to support that such liabilities reduce Petitioner's
15 property tax value. Additionally, as Respondent points out, for purposes of the CEA approach, such a
16 deduction would be directly contrary to Property Tax Rule 8 and relevant Board guidance. Further, no
17 legal or appraisal support is provided with respect to the proposed deduction to the HCLD or CEA
18 value indicators, as such expenses are undisputedly related to past events, that are unlikely to occur in
19 the future, even if the total liability from such past events are still being finalized as remaining claims
20 are settled, litigated, or otherwise resolved.

21 We find that Petitioner has not shown specific evidence or argument to prove that the claimed
22 expenses must be deducted from both the CEA and HCLD value indicators, nor has Petitioner shown
23 that such expenses represent ordinary and future, anticipated operating expenses. Further, we concur
24 with the Respondent that such expenses are properly excluded from the CEA value indicator
25 calculation under Property Tax Rule 8. Additionally, even if wildfire liabilities should now be
26 considered ordinary expenses reasonably occurring in the future, it is undisputed that these particular
27 liabilities are a result of liability resulting from past wildfires and mudslides (in 2017 and 2018), which
28 are not appropriate to deduct from the future income stream to be capitalized. Petitioner's argument

1 appears to rest on the Board finding Respondent's appraisal judgment and approach to these wildfire
2 liabilities as flawed, without providing any specific evidence or legal or appraisal support, and that the
3 Board grant Petitioner's unsupported request to deduct \$858 million from both the CEA and HCLD
4 value indicators. However, it is well settled that the burden of proof is on the Petitioner. Based on the
5 foregoing, we find that Petitioner has not met its burden of proof as to this issue.

6
7 **Legal Issue 4: Whether Petitioner Has Shown that Respondent Improperly Assessed \$1.6 Billion of**
8 **Wildfire Mitigation Capital Expenditures.**

9 **Findings of Fact and Related Contentions**

10 Petitioner contends that Respondent improperly assessed \$1.6 billion of wildfire mitigation
11 capital expenditures in its 2023 assessment of SCE,²¹ based on the incorrect assumption that these
12 assets generate a cash flow from ratepayers, allowing SCE to realize a return on investment for these
13 capital expenditures. Petitioner contends that under AB 1054, SCE is required to make capital
14 expenditures to the wildfire mitigation fund but is precluded from earning both a rate of return of and
15 a return on the investment. Petitioner asserts this inclusion results in approximately \$1.6 billion that
16 should be removed from SCE's HCLD indicator.

17 Petitioner further asserts that a potential buyer would not have the opportunity to recover the
18 wildfire mitigation capital expenditures, and thus concludes that the first \$1.6 billion of wildfire
19 mitigation capital expenditures have little or no value. Petitioner cites the analysis in the draft 2020
20 EY report to support that a prospective buyer would not pay for a \$1.6 billion capital expenditure that
21 produces no return. Petitioner argues that Respondent's appraisal assumes that the expenditures are
22 being capitalized and included in the rate base, on which utilities are permitted to earn a return, and
23 concludes that if the capital expenditures are not included in Petitioner's rate base, they must be
24 removed from the HCLD value indicator.

25 Petitioner then argues that in the alternative, these capital expenditures are intangible assets
26 exempt from taxation, as such expenditures are statutorily required for Petitioner to continue to
27 operate, and thus confer intangible rights upon Edison and any future purchaser.

28

²¹ The \$1.6 billion referenced appears to stem from the paid to date portion of Petitioner's required wildfire capital expenditures under AB 1054.

1 Petitioner then adds that the property it spent \$1.6 billion replacing has been discarded, so
2 even if Petitioner may have the right to continue to receive a return with respect to the formerly
3 owned property, since such property is no longer owned by Petitioner the right to receive a return on
4 the former property is an intangible right not assessable for property tax purposes. Further, the cost of
5 this property should be removed from the HCLD and the income Edison receives with respect to this
6 intangible right should be excluded from the CEA indicator.

7 Petitioner further contends SAPD’s explanation excerpted from AH 502, “The HCLD for
8 property tax appraisal purposes, therefore, differs from the rate base as established by the regulatory
9 agency. Some items included in the rate base are not included in the HCLD and some items included
10 in the rate base are included in the HCLD,” is misleading, and in context is only meant to
11 acknowledge Construction Work in Progress (CWIP)’s exclusion from the rate base but taxability for
12 property tax purposes. (AH 502, pp. 146-147.) Petitioner also contends SAPD misunderstands the
13 concept of “return of” capital in a regulatory context. Specifically, Petitioner contends that while
14 SAPD argues that Petitioner is being paid back for its cost through a special surcharge paid by
15 ratepayers, CPUC D.20-11-007 requires that the special surcharges collected from ratepayers will
16 repay the bondholders of the Recovery Bond, such that Petitioner will not recover either the return of
17 or a return on the wildfire mitigation investments. Petitioner then argues that SAPD ignores basic
18 valuation principles, as Petitioner contends assets, to have value under a CEA approach, must produce
19 income, or, under the HCLD approach, must be included in the rate base.

20 Respondent contends no adjustment is appropriate for this issue. Respondent notes Petitioner
21 essentially argues that because these costs are not included in rate base, these assets have no value and
22 must be excluded entirely from the HCLD value indicator. However, Respondent explains that whether
23 or not property is included in the rate base of a regulated utility is not solely determinative of whether
24 it has “value” for property tax purposes and thus must or must not be included in HCLD. Respondent
25 cites AH 502, which states:

26 The HCLD for property tax appraisal purposes therefore, differs from the rate base as
27 established by the regulatory agency. Some items included in rate base are not included
28 in the HCLD, and some items not included in the rate base are included in the HCLD.
(AH 502, p. 146-147.) Therefore, Respondent contends Petitioner’s view is false that all costs excluded
from rate base must be excluded from HCLD.

1 Specifically, Respondent notes the wildfire mitigation capital expenditures have value, as
2 Petitioner spent \$1.6 billion to purchase those assets and had they not, Petitioner (or any potential
3 purchaser) would not be compliant with AB 1054.

4 Respondent notes SAPD has recognized that there is an impact on value to these capital
5 expenditures being excluded from the rate base and has made a proper adjustment in Petitioner's 2023
6 Board-adopted value.²² Respondent notes when making capital expenditures, firms expect both a
7 "return of" their invested capital as well as a "return on" their invested capital. Respondent notes a
8 "return of" capital accounts for a recovery of the investment while a "return on" capital accounts for a
9 reward for making an investment. (AH 502, p. 62.) Both of these components are captured in the
10 capitalization rate, which provides explicitly or implicitly for both the return of and the return on
11 capital.

12 Respondent contends that because AB 1054 prohibits Petitioner from earning a return on
13 equity but does not prohibit earning a "return of" or a debt return on its capital expenditure, SAPD
14 made appropriate adjustments to the HCLD cost indicator to account for this, by calculating the
15 present value of the income using a discount rate that excludes the equity portion of the
16 capitalization rate. The excluded equity portion represents the return *on* the investment, and
17 properly leaves in the rate for return *of* the investment. Respondent then removed the difference
18 between this present value amount and the total \$1.6 billion capital expenditure, resulting in an
19 approximately \$711 million reduction to the HCLD value indicator, which was already reflected in
20 Petitioner's 2023 Board-adopted unitary value. Thus, Respondent maintains Petitioner's wildfire
21 mitigation capital expenditures were appropriately valued.

22 Respondent also contends that Petitioner's alternative arguments that the capital
23 expenditures are intangible assets exempt from taxation, and that the property Petitioner spent \$1.6
24 billion replacing has been discarded and is no longer owned by Petitioner, are each claimed
25 without evidence. Respondent asserts that these arguments ignore the fact that \$1.6 billion dollars
26 of tangible, depreciable equipment was purchased and is currently installed as a part of Petitioner's
27 physical infrastructure. Respondent states that the equipment that was actually replaced and
28

²² \$711 million was deducted from the HCLD indicator of value.

1 discarded will be removed from the HCLD value indicator and therefore has no unitary value, as is
2 done with all equipment that is retired and removed from an assessee's books and records.
3 Accordingly, Respondent maintains these alternative arguments do not support any adjustment to
4 Petitioner's unitary value.

5 Applicable Law and Appraisal Principles

6 Burden of Proof

7 Assessing officers are presumed to have properly performed their duties. (Evid. Code, § 664.)
8 Therefore, Petitioner has the burden of showing that the assessment is incorrect or illegal. (*ITT World*
9 *Communications v. Santa Clara* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 246; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 5541,
10 subd. (a).)

11 Value Standard

12 See Issues 1 and 2, Applicable Law, p. 12.

13 HCLD Approach to Value

14 See Issues 1 and 2, Applicable Law, p. 12-13.

15 Analysis and Disposition

16 Respondent is presumed to have correctly determined the value of the property at issue, and
17 Petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise.

18 Here, Petitioner contends that Respondent should deduct the entire \$1.6 billion wildfire capital
19 expenditures from its HCLD value indicator because Petitioner is not allowed to earn a rate of return
20 on the expenditures, and a prospective buyer would not pay for a \$1.6 billion capital expenditure that
21 produces zero return. Petitioner also argues that if the capital expenditures are not included in the rate
22 base, it should be removed from the HCLD value indicator. However, Respondent explains that the
23 HCLD approach for property tax appraisal purposes differs from the rate base as established by the
24 regulatory agency, and that the capital expenditures have value as Petitioner spent \$1.6 billion to
25 purchase assets from which Petitioner will earn a return of the expenditures through depreciation and a
26 return on the expenditures through the reimbursement of interest paid for debt service. Respondent
27 additionally contends that since AB 1054 prohibits Petitioner from earning an equity return on this
28 capital expenditure but does not prohibit it from earning a return of or a debt return on its capital

1 expenditure, Respondent has already adjusted the HCLD value indicator appropriately for these
2 expenses: by calculating the present value of the income using a discount rate that excludes the equity
3 portion of the capitalization rate, reflecting that Petitioner will not receive a *return on* the investment,
4 but properly leaves the rate for *return of* its capital expenditure, which Petitioner will receive the
5 benefit of. Respondent noted this calculation resulted in an approximately \$711 million reduction to
6 the HCLD value indicator, which was already reflected in Petitioner’s 2023 Board-adopted unitary
7 value. We find that Petitioner has not shown specific evidence or argument to prove error within
8 Respondent’s calculation of the existing adjustment to the HCLD attributable to these assets.

9 Here, while Petitioner contends in the alternative that the capital expenditures, by being
10 compliant with AB 1054, makes them intangible assets exempt from taxation, Petitioner provides no
11 explanation, evidence, or legal or appraisal basis or authority to support this contention.²³ Petitioner
12 further contends that the property Petitioner spent \$1.6 billion replacing has been discarded and is no
13 longer owned by Petitioner, but, as Respondent points out, Petitioner has provided no specific evidence
14 of retired assets being assessed within its 2023 unitary value. Further, Respondent states that the \$1.6
15 billion dollars of tangible, depreciable equipment was purchased and is currently installed as part of
16 Petitioner’s physical infrastructure. Further, we concur with Respondent that neither AB 1054, nor any
17 other provision of law identified supports the exemption of these assets from property taxation.

18 Based on the evidence and arguments submitted on both the primary and alternative arguments,
19 we find that Petitioner has not shown specific evidence or argument to prove error or illegality, and
20 thus has not met their burden of proof as to this issue.

21
22 **Legal Issue 5: Whether Petitioner Has Shown that Respondent Erred in Its Treatment of Wildfire**
23 **Insurance Fund Related Contributions.**

24 **Findings of Fact and Related Contentions**

25 Petitioner notes that SCE made an initial contribution of \$2.4 billion to the Wildfire Insurance
26 Fund, which is intended to provide some insurance coverage in the event of a catastrophic wildfire
27 event, on September 9, 2019, and Petitioner will make 10 annual contributions of approximately \$95
28

²³ Cal. Const. Art. XIII, section 1 states: “Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or the laws of the United States [a]ll property is taxable and shall be assessed at the same percentage of fair market value.”

1 million per year to the fund, consistent with section 3292, subdivision (a) of the California Public
2 Utilities Code.²⁴ Petitioner asserts Respondent erred in its treatment of the Wildfire Insurance Fund-
3 related contribution by ignoring the initial contribution of \$2.4 billion, instead arguing that the initial
4 contribution and annual payments should be treated as insurance premiums and spread ratably over
5 Petitioner’s estimated 15-year coverage period, yielding an annual estimated insurance fund expense
6 of \$215 million. Petitioner contends the proper treatment of these expenses would reduce the CEA
7 value indicator by \$1,499,504,917 and the overall unitary value by \$1,124,628,688.

8 Petitioner claims the Wildfire Insurance Fund contributions are being treated similarly to
9 prepaid insurance under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). As no period of
10 coverage was provided in AB 1054, Petitioner is allocating the total expense ratably based on its
11 estimated fifteen-year period of coverage.

12 Next, Petitioner refutes SAPD’s arguments, presumably from the 2020 petition discussion,
13 that a prospective purchaser would not consider the \$2.4 billion prepaid insurance in the company’s
14 value. Instead, Petitioner contends Wildfire Insurance Fund contributions are equivalent to the
15 payment of insurance premiums, and that a potential purchaser would be willing to pay more for a
16 utility that had prepaid this annual contribution, as compared to a utility that had not done so, due to
17 the increased estimated insurance premiums the purchaser would have to make absent these fund
18 contributions.

19 Then, Petitioner argues that SAPD is mischaracterizing the prepaid expense as excludable
20 amortization or depreciation expense, as the expense at issue constitutes prepaid insurance or some
21 other intangible asset that will reduce future expenses, as the initial contribution was a legal
22 prerequisite that gave Petitioner the right to participate in the Fund, which Petitioner contends is an
23 intangible right.

24 Additionally, Petitioner contends that AH 502 states that property insurance may be prepaid for
25 three years and deducted as an expense in a direct capitalization income approach, though in
26 Petitioner’s case the coverage is estimated at 15 years, and that an “appraiser would annualize this
27 expense in direct capitalization.” (AH 502, p. 71-72.)

28 _____
²⁴ Petitioner cites its 2022 Form 10k, at 157.

See <https://www.edison.com/investors/financial-reports-information/annual-reports> (as of November 30, 2023.)

1 Petitioner further contends that the \$215 million annual expense should be included in the CEA
2 value indicator because future insurance premiums are bound to increase consistent with the wildfire
3 risk conditions in California.

4 Petitioner additionally notes Respondent’s proper treatment of such expenses may actually
5 increase income in future years due to reduced future expenses, and that portion of the increased
6 income related to the initial contribution should be removed from the income approach as income from
7 an intangible asset.

8 Petitioner claims that Respondent’s treatment of the fund contributions is nonuniform in its
9 application to all state assessees, claiming that the initial contribution was allowed for another state
10 assessee. On this basis, Petitioner asserts respondent is acting arbitrarily, unfairly, or otherwise non-
11 uniform in its treatment of Petitioner.

12 Petitioner further contends that SAPD has incorrectly interpreted *De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County*
13 *of San Diego* (“*De Luz*”) (1955) 45 Cal.2d 546, explaining that while *De Luz* precludes a deduction for
14 “depreciation of the property,” it does not preclude a deduction for operating and maintenance
15 expenses, and prepaid insurance are such expenses. Petitioner cites to AH 502 to support its argument,
16 wherein under a direct capitalization method, like the CEA, “expenses are annualized even though
17 some expenditures may not actually occur on an annual basis” and prepaid property insurance is
18 provided as an example.

19 Additionally, Petitioner references that Member Gaines’ comments in the Board hearing of
20 their 2020 petition appeared to support this treatment of such expenses as annualized expenses
21 removable from the CEA calculation.

22 Petitioner argues that while Respondent is attempting to create a requirement that another
23 future AB 1054-like contribution will occur, the guidance does not create a requirement that the
24 deduction of the prepaid insurance is only allowed when an identical payment is guaranteed to occur in
25 the future. Petitioner also asserts that these prepaid insurance expenses would be viewed as relevant
26 expenses to any prospective buyer and be considered regular and reoccurring in light of wildfire
27 likelihood in California. Additionally, Petitioner notes the requested treatment is consistent with its
28 audited financial statements. Petitioner concludes that the adjustment of approximately \$1.07 billion

1 (CEA-adjusted present value of the annual expensing of \$214 million over the remaining coverage
2 period) for the prepaid insurance contribution of \$2.4 billion and the annual contributions of \$95
3 million is reasonable and should be allowed.

4 Respondent contends that consistent with Property Tax Rule 8 and Board issued appraisal
5 guidance, Respondent appropriately disallowed the \$2.4 billion initial contribution as an expense in the
6 CEA value indicator. (*UVM* pp. 35-37 and AH 502, p. 74.) Respondent explains amortization and
7 depreciation are not deducted when computing the future income stream to be capitalized because
8 doing so would artificially lower that future income stream by subtracting non-cash expenses and
9 would also cause the future income stream to no longer be a *future* income stream (since it would then
10 include past expenses); in other words, deducting either is contrary to the principles on which the CEA
11 indicator is premised. Thus, pursuant to Property Tax Rule 8 and AH 502's interpretation thereof,
12 Respondent did not allow the \$2.4 billion initial contribution as an expense in the CEA value indicator
13 because the contribution was made in a previous year.

14 Respondent contends Petitioner admits that the Wildfire Insurance Fund-related initial
15 contribution is both a past, non-recurring expense and that it is being amortized over a 15-year period
16 and Respondent maintains the treatment of amortized costs in the CEA indicator of value is explained
17 in Rule 8 and AH 502. (*Ibid.*) Further, in *De Luz*, the California Supreme Court made clear that
18 amortized costs are not deducted from the anticipated income to be capitalized.²⁵

19 While Respondent acknowledges the specific items which the *De Luz* Court considered were
20 leasehold improvements, Respondent maintains the Court's logic applies to capitalized assets
21 generally.

22
23
24 ²⁵ In determining what costs would be considered in valuing a leasehold interest under a capitalization of income method,
25 the Court stated that:

26 ...anticipated net earnings equal expected gross income less necessary expenditures for maintenance, operation,
27 and taxes.[fn omitted] *No deduction is made for the cost of the lease to the present lessee, i.e., his charges for rent
and amortization of improvements*, for to a prospective assignee the value of a leasehold is measured solely by
28 anticipated gross income less *expected necessary* expenditures.

(*De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, supra*, p. 566, emphasis added.) The Court concluded:

Furthermore, in determining the income to be capitalized to establish value for appraisal purposes, *no deduction
can be made for amortization*. [Citation.] '[N]o concept of income which includes ... depreciation in capital value
as a positive or negative item of income, is acceptable as a basis of valuation under the 'capitalized income'
method.' [Citation.]

(*Ibid.*)

1 Additionally, Respondent notes that the accounting treatment of the initial contribution is
2 undisputed: an asset entitled “Wildfire Insurance Fund contributions” was created on Petitioner’s
3 balance sheet and a corresponding amortized portion is deducted on SCE’s income statement. Thus,
4 Respondent asserts that consistent with AH 502, *De Luz*, and generally accepted appraisal practice, the
5 initial contribution’s treatment for property tax valuation purposes should also be undisputed.

6 Then, Respondent asserts Petitioner’s contention that the expense be treated akin to prepaid
7 insurance, ratably deducted over some coverage period, misses the issue, as the issue is not over
8 whether the initial contribution is or is not prepaid insurance. Respondent confirms that Petitioner’s
9 ordinary insurance expense was allowed, but instead asserts the issue is over whether the initial
10 contribution is an ordinary, recurring expense and Petitioner has admitted that it is not in its 2022 10-
11 K.²⁶

12 Next, Respondent contends Petitioner’s argument that the amortized expense will be
13 reoccurring due to the new reality of wildfires is also misframed; instead, Respondent asserts the issue
14 is whether the Petitioner will need to make another AB 1054-like initial contribution, something no
15 one can know at this time.

16 Respondent also notes that Petitioner itself does not know how long the AB 1054 fund will last,
17 as in 2019, SCE estimated 10 years (SCE 2020 10-k, p. 65), while in 2020, the estimate was increased
18 to 15 years in its 2020 Form 10-k (SCE 2020 10-k, p. 122.). However, Respondent notes that in 2019,
19 the CPUC stated that “arguments positing that the fund may be exhausted before 2035 are premature.”
20 (CPUC, Decision D19-12-056, p. 37.) This has been reinforced by the fact that as of August 4, 2023,
21 the fund has not been used. Accordingly, Respondent concludes any deduction allowed of this initial
22 contribution based on some likelihood that some future AB 1054-like contribution will have to be
23 made is pure speculation. Respondent summarizes that because the \$2.4 billion initial contribution is a
24 past expense that need not be paid again, and because its deduction as amortization in future years is
25 only for the purpose of computing accounting net income, the initial contribution is not deductible
26 from the future income stream to be capitalized for property tax purposes.

27 _____
28 ²⁶ See Edison International’s 2022 Form 10-K, pp. 5, where SCE lists various “non-core items” that “management does not consider representative of ongoing earnings,” which includes a line item under this descriptor stating, “Charges of \$214 million (\$154 million after-tax) recorded in 2022 and \$215 million (\$155 million after-tax) recorded in 2021 from the amortization of SCE’s contributions to the Wildfire Insurance Fund.”

1 Respondent also reaffirms that while the initial contribution is not deductible, the required
2 annual contributions to the Wildfire Insurance Fund are allowable, as they are ordinary expenses
3 expected to be paid for a 10-year term. Respondent notes this resulted in a \$502 million reduction to
4 the CEA value indicator, which has already been included in Petitioner’s 2023 Board-adopted value.

5 Finally, Respondent disputes inequitable treatment amongst state assesseees occurred, as the
6 allowance or disallowance of the initial contributions were based on a consistent application of the
7 same principles to all utilities who contributed to the fund.

8 In sum, Respondent maintains that all other arguments made by Petitioner on this issue remain
9 unpersuasive, particularly those that attempt to liken the initial contribution to a deductible intangible
10 asset, as the relevant legal and appraisal authority indicates these contributions are being appropriately
11 treated. Similarly, Respondent maintains no violation of Article XIII, Section 1 of the California
12 Constitution, the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, or the Equal Protection
13 Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions occurred.

14 **Applicable Law and Appraisal Principles**

15 **Burden of Proof**

16 Assessing officers are presumed to have properly performed their duties. (Evid. Code, § 664.)
17 Therefore, Petitioner has the burden of showing that the assessment is incorrect or illegal. (*ITT World*
18 *Communications v. Santa Clara* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 246; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 5541,
19 subd. (a).)

20 **Value Standard**

21 See Issues 1 and 2, Applicable Law, p. 12.

22 **Income Approach to Value**

23 See Issues 1 and 2, Applicable Law, p. 13-14.

24 **The Income Approach: Amortization and Depreciation**

25 The income approach to value is generally described as any method that converts future
26 anticipated income into present value. (UVM, p. 35.) It is premised on the assumption that investors
27 will buy and sell property based on the income it is *expected* to yield. (*Ibid.*) The income that is
28 converted into present value is appraisal income, or “net return” as defined by Rule 8. (UVM, pp. 35-

1 37; Rule 8, subd. (c).) Net return is the difference between gross return and gross outgo. (Rule 8,
2 subd. (c).) Amortization and depreciation are explicitly excluded from gross outgo. (*Ibid.*) AH 502
3 explains why this is the case:

4 The reference to depreciation and amortization in subdivision (c) [of Rule 8] refers to the
5 accounting concept of depreciation (in this context, **amortization is a synonym for**
6 **depreciation**). Accounting depreciation and **amortization** charges are **non-cash**
7 **expenses** designed to spread, or match, the cost of a **previously incurred** cash
8 expenditure over future accounting periods. There are at least two theoretical reasons for
9 the exclusion of accounting depreciation charges as expenses. First, doing so incorporates
10 the recognized cash flow concept of the amount of income to be capitalized. Second,
11 accounting depreciation is a means of capital recovery based on past expenditures.
12 **However, in real estate valuation the point is not to recover past expenditures, but**
13 **rather to estimate the value that future income will be able to recover.**

14 (AH 502, p. 74; Emphases added.) In other words, amortization and depreciation are not deducted
15 when computing the future income stream to be capitalized because doing so would artificially lower
16 that future income stream by subtracting non-cash expenses and would also cause the future income
17 stream to no longer be a *future income* stream, as it would include past expenses. The *Supreme Court*
18 has confirmed this understanding in *De Luz*; the Court concluded,

19 Furthermore, ***in determining the income to be capitalized*** to establish value for appraisal
20 purposes, ***no deduction can be made for amortization.*** [Citation.] ‘[N]o concept of income
21 which includes ... depreciation in capital value as a positive or negative item of income, is
22 acceptable as a basis of valuation under the ‘capitalized income’ method.’ [Citation.]

23 (*De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, supra*, p. 566, emphasis added.)

24 Analysis and Disposition

25 Respondent is presumed to have correctly determined the value of the property at issue, and
26 Petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise.

27 Here, Petitioner contends that Respondent’s calculated present value deduction for the
28 remaining, future Wildfire Insurance Fund payments understates the annualized and prepaid-expenses
associated with the full contribution to the wildfire insurance fund; instead, Petitioner asserts the initial
contribution of \$2.4 billion and the 10 annualized payments should be treated as prepaid insurance
expenses, and capitalized within the Respondent’s CEA value indicator calculation as expenses over a
15-year period, as such treatment is reasonable in its opinion, as well as consistent with its own

1 accounting treatment of such expenses. However, Respondent notes Petitioner admits the initial
2 contribution has been amortized, and contends amortized or past, non-ordinary expenses are not
3 properly deducted from the CEA value calculation, as a capitalized earning approach only correctly
4 reflects future, ordinary expenses, not past expenses, consistent with relevant Property Tax Rule 8 and
5 appraisal principals.

6 We find that Petitioner has not shown specific evidence or argument to prove error within
7 Respondent's calculation, which deducts the present value of the future remaining annual payments of
8 \$95 million already reflected in Petitioner's 2023 Board-adopted value, consistent with relevant case
9 law, Property Tax Rule 8, and relevant Board guidance in the calculation of the CEA value indicator.
10 We also concur with Respondent that Petitioner has not provided explanation, evidence or legal or
11 appraisal authority that supports the treatment of the expenses as an intangible or nontaxable right. We
12 also find that although Petitioner claims inequitable treatment, violation of due process and or equal
13 protection clauses, and otherwise unfair or uneven application of relevant law compared to other state
14 assessees, Petitioner has provided no evidence thereof, nor have we seen any evidence thereof in the
15 record.

16 **DECISION**

17 Accordingly, the 2023 petition for reassessment is denied as to all issues, thereby affirming the
18 2023 Board-adopted unitary value.*

19 Antonio Vazquez _____, Chair

20 Sally J. Lieber _____, Vice Chair

21 Mike Schaefer _____, Member

22 Malia M. Cohen _____, Controller

23
24
25 *This decision was rendered in Sacramento, California on December 12, 2023. The summary decision
26 document memorializing this decision was approved on February 21, 2024, in Sacramento, California.
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