Laws, Regulations & Annotations
Property Taxes Law Guide – Revision 2014
Revenue and Taxation Code
Part 1. General Provisions
Chapter 1. Construction
(a) Possession of, claim to, or right to the possession of land or improvements that is independent, durable, and exclusive of rights held by others in the property, except when coupled with ownership of the land or improvements in the same person. For the purpose of this subdivision:
(1) "Independent" means the ability to exercise authority and exert control over the management or operation of the property or improvements, separate and apart from the policies, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations of the public owner of the property or improvements. A possession or use is independent if the possession or operation of the property is sufficiently autonomous to constitute more than a mere agency.
(2) "Durable" means for a determinable period with a reasonable certainty that the use, possession, or claim with respect to the property or improvements will continue for that period.
(3) "Exclusive" means the enjoyment of a beneficial use of land or improvements, together with the ability to exclude from occupancy by means of legal process others who may interfere with that enjoyment. For purposes of this paragraph, "exclusive use" includes the following types of use in property:
(A) Sole occupancy or use of property or improvements.
(B) Use as a cotenant.
(C) Concurrent use by a person who has a primary or prevailing right to use property or improvements at any time.
(D) Concurrent uses by persons making qualitatively different uses of property or improvements.
(E) Concurrent use by persons engaged in similar uses that diminish the quantity or quality of the property or improvements.
(F) Concurrent use that does not diminish the quantity or quality of the property or improvements, if the number of those concurrent use grants is restricted.
A use of property or improvements that does not contain one of the elements in subparagraphs (A) to (F), inclusive, shall be rebuttably presumed to be a nonexclusive use.
(b) Taxable improvements on tax-exempt land.
Any possessory interest may, in the discretion of the county board of supervisors, be considered as sufficient security for the payment of any taxes levied thereon and may be placed on the secured roll.
Leasehold estates for the production of gas, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances from beneath the surface of the earth, and other rights relating to these substances which constitute incorporeal hereditaments or profits a prendre, are sufficient security for the payment of taxes levied thereon. These estates and rights shall not be classified as possessory interests, but shall be placed on the secured roll.
If the tax on any possessory interest or leasehold estate for the production of gas, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances is unpaid when any installment of secured taxes become delinquent, the tax collector may use those collection procedures which are available for the collection of assessments on the unsecured roll.
If the tax on any possessory interest or leasehold estate for the production of gas, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances remains unpaid at the time set for the declaration of default for taxes carried on the secured roll, the possessory interest tax together with any penalty and costs which may be accrued thereon while on the secured roll shall be transferred to the unsecured roll.
History.—Stats. 1941, p. 409, operative February 1, 1941, substituted last portion of (a) beginning with "coupled" for words "resulting from ownership of the land or improvements." Stats. 1943, p. 3078, in effect August 4, 1943, added provisions relating to oil and gas leases. Stats. 1957, p. 1968, in effect September 11, 1957, substituted "three years" for "one year" in next to last sentence. Stats. 1972, p. 2608, in effect March 7, 1973, authorized the board of supervisors in counties having a population of 4,000,000 or more, in its discretion, to consider possessory interests as sufficient security for payment of property taxes thereon and to place them on the secured roll; and specified collection procedures with respect to unpaid taxes on possessory interests. Stats. 1978, Ch. 576, in effect August 31, 1978, added the phrase in the second paragraph of subdivision (b) beginning with the words "and for the 1978–79" and ending with the words "Section 2237.". Stats. 1979, Ch. 4, in effect February 28, 1979, deleted second sentence of second paragraph of subdivision (b) limiting its application to counties of more than 4,000,000 population. Stats. 1980, Ch. 411, in effect July 11, 1980, operative January 1, 1981, substituted "Any" for "All" at the beginning of the second paragraph; and substituted "any" for "the last" after "when", and "may" for "shall" in the fourth paragraph; and substituted "any" for "such" in the last paragraph of subdivision (b). Stats. 1985, Ch. 316, effective January 1, 1986, substituted "these" for "such" after "other rights relating to" in the first sentence and before "estates" in the second sentence of the third paragraph; and substituted "declaration of default" for "sale to the state" after "the" and substituted "the" for "such" after "taxes carried on the secured roll" in the fifth paragraph. Stats. 1995, Ch. 498, in effect January 1, 1996, added "that is . . . the property" after "improvements,", in the first sentence of subdivision (a); added second sentence in subdivision (a), including paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) and subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (3); and added third sentence in subdivision (a). Stats. 1996, Ch. 171, in effect July 17, 1996, substituted "possession" for "possessor" after "if the" in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).
Note.—The distinction between "possessory interests" and other "real estate" is important because under this section and Section 109 an assessment of the former is to be entered on the unsecured roll if the owner does not own other real property in the same county sufficient to secure the payment of the taxes on the possessory interests under Section 2190. Under Sections 2901, 2903, and 2951 taxes on property on the unsecured roll are due immediately on assessment and may be collected by the assessor by seizure and sale of the property.
Construction.—Possessory interests taxable under this section include privately held possessory interests in property owned by the federal, state, or municipal government, since the use is private rather than public. However, the governmental entity does not lose its tax exemption by leasing its land. The reversion is not taxed, for it is only the value of the use for the unexpired term of the lease that is assessed. This rule applies to property owned by public schools and colleges. Connolly v. Orange County, 1 Cal.4th 1105.
Leaseholds.—A leasehold estate carries a right to the possession of land, and therefore constitutes real property for purposes of taxation. Although ordinarily a leasehold is taxed to the owner of the reversionary interest, the value of the lessee's estate being treated as a constituent part of the valuation of the freehold, where the reversion is publicly owned and therefore tax exempt, a separate assessment of the leasehold to the lessee may be had. San Pedro, etc. R. R. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18; Hammond Lumber Co. v. Los Angeles County, 104 Cal.App. 235; Hammond Lumber Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.App.2d 277. A separate assessment of the possessory interest in leased public lands to a sublessee in possession is valid. Tilden v. Orange County, 89 Cal.App.2d 586.
A lessee of publicly owned property need not have absolute control over the property possessed to constitute an "independent" use. If the possessor exercises sufficient authority and control over the property possessed, it may be required to pay property taxes even if it shares possession with the government entity. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal.App.4th 552.
A Chinese state-owned air carrier's leasehold possessory interests and landing rights at airport were properly taxed by the county under Revenue and Taxation Code Sections 107 and 107.9. Imposition of property taxes was not prohibited by tax treaty because treaty created exemption only for income taxes. Taxes on leasehold and possessory interests are not contrary to U.S. Internal Revenue Code or the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, where they were not a tax on gross income, but actually a property tax. Air China Limited v. County of San Mateo, 174 Cal.App.4th 14.
The peculiar characteristics of an oil lease also justify a separate assessment of a leasehold. After the discovery of oil, the value of the lessor's interest is much less than it would be if he had the entire estate. The lessee has no right to the usufruct of the soil, but does have the right to extract a certain part of the substance of the land itself. Graciosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 155 Cal. 140.
As a result of the 1943 amendment to this section, the interest of a lessee under an oil and gas lease is subject to the tax rate for the current year rather than for the preceding year. As so construed the amendment does not violate former Article XIII, Section 9a, of the Constitution. Delaney v. Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561; Hoyt v. Woody, 25 Cal.2d 947. Collection procedures, however, follow those for unsecured taxes, i.e., by seizure and sale or against the personal liability of the assessee. Picchi v. Montgomery, 261 Cal.App.2d 246.
A shipbuilding corporation having a right under contracts with the United States Maritime Commission to the exclusive use and possession as an independent contractor, of the land and facilities of a shipyard owned by the United States and the shipbuilding facilities owned by the United States in another shipyard is a lessee of the property and its possessory interest therein is taxable. Kaiser Co., Inc. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610. See also Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd, 43 Cal.2d 157.
A "drilling and operating agreement" granting the exclusive right to drill for oil and gas for a term of years, and providing that the driller be reimbursed for his costs from the proceeds of sale, that title to the oil and gas produced remain in the landowner until paid for and that the driller have the exclusive right and be required to purchase all of the product, vests in the driller a taxable incorporeal hereditament or profit a prendre. Los Angeles County v. Continental Corp., 113 Cal.App.2d 207.
Amortization and rental provisions which leave the lessee without equity in a garage operated by a nonprofit corporation under a lease from a city are not to be considered in valuation of the leasehold interest in the garage for tax purposes. Stamps v. Board of Supervisors, 233 Cal.App.2d 256.
A city may covenant by lease to pay the taxes for its lessee so long as the consideration was paid for a public purpose such as the public parking facility in question. Cane v. City and County of San Francisco, 78 Cal.App.3d 654.
A possessory interest acquired by a contractor under a lease from a city was retained upon the leaseback of the property to the city. Possession by the city under the sublease was not in opposition to but pursuant to and subordinate to the contractor's right. City of Desert Hot Springs v. Riverside County, 91 Cal.App.3d 441. A tenant's month-to-month tenancy was properly treated as a durable possessory interest in the property even though his lease could be terminated, as the tenant had possessed the property for several years. Although the possessory interest had no stated term of possession, the tenant had the same right to continued possession as any tenant who interest is subject to termination or renewal. Therefore, value could be ascribed to the expectation of continued possession of the property by the tenant. Silveira v. County of Alameda, 139 Cal.App.4th 989.
A car rental agency leased space at county-owned airport. Under its lease, the car rental agency had rights to an area that members of the public clearly did not share, but which it did share with six other lessees in a fashion that restricted neither the quantity of the property nor the quality of its use. The car rental agency's rights under its lease were sufficiently exclusive to establish its possessory interest and permit taxation. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (2010) 181 Cal. App. 4th 1316.
Treaties.—A Chinese state-owned air carrier's leasehold possessory interests and landing rights at airport were properly taxed by the county under Revenue and Taxation Code Sections 107 and 107.9. Imposition of property taxes was not prohibited by tax treaty because treaty created exemption only for income taxes. Air China Limited v. County of San Mateo, 174 Cal.App.4th 14.
Government lands.—The possessory interest of an occupant or claimant of public lands of the State or of the United States is taxable, although no part of the purchase price has been paid. People v. Donnelly, 58 Cal. 144; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645. A tax against the land itself is void. Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581; City of Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655. A holder of a certificate of purchase of lieu lands who has never been in possession or claimed the right of possession is not taxable thereon. The term "claim to land" contemplates an actual possession of the land claimed. Slade v. Butte County, 14 Cal.App. 453.
In an action brought by a county to collect unsecured property taxes levied against a leasehold in land leased by the United States to defendant for construction of family dwelling units for military and civilian personnel under a federal statute consenting to local taxation with a deduction therefrom for payments made by the United States in lieu of taxes, although the outcome would not directly affect the pecuniary interest of the United States, the government may intervene because it does have an interest in sustaining its fiscal policy. San Bernardino County v. Harsh California Corp., 52 Cal.2d 341.
The exclusive right to the use of a house furnished by a tax exempt irrigation district to its employee on a month-to-month basis was a taxable possessory interest even though the right was terminable with the termination of employment. McCaslin v. DeCamp, 248 Cal.App.2d 13. An operator of a restaurant at a municipal golf course was held to have a taxable interest where his possession was marked by independence, durability and exclusiveness even though the basis of his rights was a contract rather than a lease. Mattson v. Contra Costa County, 258 Cal.App.2d 205.
A shipping company using a city's marine terminals under a "Preferential Assignment Agreement" had a taxable possessory interest where the agreement gave the company exclusive possession against all the world, including the city, whenever it had a "business need" for the premises, where the company had continuously used and had a business need to use all of the premises, and where analysis of the entire agreement established that it was comparable to a lease. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Alameda County, 36 Cal.App.3d 837. Vessel owner's contractual right to use publicly owned maritime facilities may be a possessory interest in real property that is subject to taxation, even though the right is concurrent with the rights of others and subject to restrictions on right of use. Exclusive use is not destroyed by concurrent use when the extent of each party's use is limited by the other party's right to use the property at the same time. And possible interference with use affects value, but not the existence of a possessory right. Possible interference with use affects value, but not existence of a possessory right. Euro-Pacific v. Alameda County, 11 Cal.App.4th 891. For taxable possessory interest purposes, "independence" exists if the possessor exercises sufficient authority and control over the property possessed, as opposed to being in a mere agency relationship with the government landlord, and "absolute control" is not necessary. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal.App.4th 552.
Possessory interests in improvements to real property are dependent for existence on real property, which in the case of a vessel can include areas aboard the vessel, the real property upon which the vessel lies, and parking areas, and an assessment of taxable possessory interests must necessarily include the value of the supporting land. Specialty Restaurants Corporation v. Los Angeles County, 111 Cal.App.3d 607.
A nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of managing exempt, state-owned property does not acquire a taxable possessory interest in the property where a principal-agent relationship exists, where the corporation is under state control and holds the property for the public benefit, and where possession by the corporation is not so exclusive as to amount to such an interest. In determining whether a possessory interest is taxable, the factors of exclusiveness, independence, durability and private benefit are weighted on a case-by-case basis. Pacific Grove-Asilomar Operating Corp. v. Monterey County, 43 Cal.App.3d 675.
Occupancy of dwelling units in national forests by U.S. Forest Service employees, which consisted of nontransferable rights of possession, terminable at the will of the federal government, together with other restrictions, results in a taxable possessory interest, the value of which must be subject to the restrictive factors. The assessment is not made against the federal government but against the usufructuary interest of the employees in the units. United States v. Fresno County, 50 Cal.App.3d 633, 429 U.S. 452.
Occupancy of dwelling units on base and off base by military personnel, being neither durable nor private, does not result in a taxable possessory interest. Even if it did result in a possessory interest, any resultant tax imposed would be constitutionally impermissible as a tax imposed upon federal functions and properties. United States v. Humboldt County, 628 F.2d 549.
Government property affixed to realty.—The right of a nonprofit corporation to use government property permanently affixed to the realty is exclusive and, hence, a taxable possessory interest. Although such right is pursuant to a yearly contract, the corporation pays no rent and cannot transfer its right without consent and the government can cancel the contract and remove the property. Since possessory interests in improvements to real property are defined as real property in sections 104 and 105 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, they are taxable as such under Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 1, although no specific statute imposes a tax on possessory interests. A provision in a contract pursuant to a government regulation that property does not lose its identity as personalty by reason of affixation to the realty does not preclude the state from classifying government property as improvements to real property for taxation purposes. Rand Corp. v. Los Angeles County, 241 Cal.App.2d 585.
Lease of grazing land.—In assessing the possessory interest of a lessee of tax-exempt land leased for grazing purposes, it is proper to capitalize the rent for the total number of years of the lease and renewal options. Natural grasses on the land, which do not require annual or seasonal planting, are not exempt from taxation as growing crops. El Tejon Cattle Co. v. San Diego County, 64 Cal.2d 428.
Mining claims.—The possessory right to a mining claim subject to a lease is taxable as a possessory interest. Bakersfield & Fresno Oil Co. v. Kern County, 144 Cal. 148.
Mineral rights.—Under Section 104 an owner's interest in fee to coal or mineral rights may be classified either as "ownership of" a portion of the land or as "minerals." It is certainly more than "the possession of, claim to, or right to the possession of land." Merchants Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103 Cal.App. 473.
Statute of limitations.—Actions under this section are controlled by the three-year period of limitations prescribed by Section 338(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The period commences to run at the date of delinquency. Los Angeles County v. Continental Corp., 113 Cal.App.2d 207.
The limitation on seizure and sale for delinquency is mandatory, not merely directory, and a tax sale after such period is void. Lieb v. Day, 130 Cal.App.2d 376.
Personal property.—The legislature has not defined personal property as including a right to its possession as it has real property. General Dynamics Corp. v. Los Angeles County, 51 Cal.2d 59.
Fixtures.—Exclusive use of two 750 ton cargo cranes, mounted on rails specially installed on the wharf, constitutes a taxable possessory interest. The cranes were properly classified as fixtures since they were intended to be a permanent part of the wharf. Seatrain Terminals of California, Inc. v. Alameda County, 83 Cal.App.3d 69.
A federal contractor had a possessory interest in a government-owned experimental fusion devise, which was properly classified as an improvement, and was not immune from ad valorem taxation under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. United States v. San Diego County, 965 F.2d 691.
Exclusive, independent, and durable interest in experimental fusion device owned by the United States constitutes a taxable possessory interest. The device was properly classified as a fixture where it weighed more than 400 tons, it was annexed to the underlying land by gravity, and the land had been modified to accommodate it. United States v. San Diego County, 53 F.3d 965.
Leasehold interest in Indian lands.—The imposition of a nondiscriminatory tax on the possessory interest of a lessee in Indian land held in trust by the federal government did not impose an undue burden on commerce with the Indians in violation of the federal Constitution, nor was it a tax directly on federal property. Palm Springs Spa, Inc. v. Riverside County, 18 Cal.App.3d 372.
A federal court refused to enjoin the imposition of a tax on the possessory interest held by lessees of Indian land holding that the tax was on the lessee's interest in the land and not on the Indians' land. The mere fact that the tax increased the financial burden on the Indians in the form of reduced rents did not vitiate the tax. Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside County, 442 F.2d 1184, cert. denied 405 U.S. 933.
The imposition of a taxable possessory interest on non-Indian lessees of reservation land is not violative of the Indian Reorganization Act. Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernardino County, 543 F.2d 1253, cert. den. 430 U.S. 983.
An ad valorem tax lien on plaintiff's possessory interest in tax-exempt Indian land was not eliminated by the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the previous owner's possessory interest by a senior lienholder, where the lien was placed on the property before the sale and the senior lienholder was aware of it and agreed to pay it but failed to do so. Thus, the property was subject to seizure and sale for delinquent taxes under this section and Section 2951. Barer v. Riverside County, 57 Cal.App.4th 558.
Federal contractor.—A federal contractor's possessory interest in experimental fusion device owned by the United States sufficiently distinguished contractor from the government, so that tax imposed on contractor was not tax on United States in violation of Supremacy Clause. United States v. San Diego County, 965 F.2d 691. It is not unconstitutional for a county to calculate the value of a taxpayer's possessory interest in an experimental fusion device by using the value of the device. United States v. San Diego County, 53 F.3d 965.
Federal grazing permits and agricultural leases.—During the term of a federal grazing permit the permittees have possession and valuable use of the land allowing them to graze their cattle on public land and thereby contribute to the growth and profitability of their enterprises. In view of the valuable interests in land conferred by the documents the court held that grazing permits as well as agricultural leases gave rise to taxable possessory interests. Board of Supervisors v. Archer, 18 Cal.App.3d 717.
The recurrent character of federal grazing permits issued subsequent to the tax lien date supports the existence of a taxable possessory interest. Dressler v. Alpine County, 64 Cal.App.3d 557.
Forest Service timber sales contracts.—The interest of timber operators created by a contract with the U.S. Forest Service whereby the timber operators obtain a present right in the standing timber and the right to go upon the federal land to harvest the timber constitutes a taxable possessory interest. There is no rule under California law that a vendee under a land sale has no taxable interest until the sale is completed. Georgia-Pacific Corporation v. Mendocino County; International Paper Company v. Siskiyou County, 340 F.Supp. 1061; 357 F.Supp. 380; 515 F.2d 285.
Non-taxable use of tax-exempt property.—Although not a basis for its decision in the case, a court indicated that the interest of an occupant in a retirement home exempt from property taxation pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 214 did not constitute a taxable possessory interest in the tax exempt premises since the occupants were using the property for a non-taxable purpose. John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove, 27 Cal.App.3d 372.
Failure to assess all possessory interests does not invalidate those assessed.—Plaintiff, holder of a preferential assignment in city harbor property, contended that assessment of the assignment (a possessory interest) was discriminatory because similar interests of others had not been assessed. Court held there was no discrimination; the other interests were different, some assessments had not been made pending outcome of plaintiff's suit, and, in general, discrepancies arising from assessor's mistake or lack of information which result in some assessments not being made are not grounds for declaring all other assessments invalid. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Los Angeles County, 29 Cal.App.3d 565.
Concessionaire agreements.—The provision of television receivers for rental to patients at a county hospital except for two wards equipped with the hospital's own sets constitutes a taxable possessory interest. The test is not exclusive possession against all the world, including the owner. If the right of possession must be shared to some extent, it is to be considered in fixing the value but does not destroy the existence of the possessory interest. Wells National Services Corporation v. Santa Clara County, 54 Cal.App.3d 579.
A coliseum and sports arena food and beverage concessionaire meets the requirement of exclusiveness and is therefore subject to a taxable possessory interest. Under property tax rule 21(e)(2) the interest of the concessionaire qualifies as a concurrent use. Stadium Concessions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.App.3d 215. A stadium food and beverage concessionaire is subject to a taxable possessory interest, the value of which does not include enterprise value as distinguished from the value of its use of the property under agreement with the stadium owner. Service America Corporation v. San Diego County, 15 Cal.App.4th 1232.
Franchise agreements.—The interests of a cable television distribution company in franchise agreements granting the company the right to use and occupy public rights of way for the purpose of distributing its service are property subject to property taxation since the company's use of the public rights of way constitutes a taxable possessory interest. A possessory interest may be the interest of either an easement holder or a mere permittee or licensee. Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. San Diego County, 185 Cal.App.3d 368; Shubat v. Sutter County Assessment Appeals Board, 13 Cal.App.4th 794. A county assessment appeals board erred in ruling that a cable television company's entire franchises, which consist of two components, the right to use public streets to lay cables and the right to charge a fee to subscribers for their use of cable facilities, were nontaxable intangibles. Both the California Constitution and statutes mandate that all property must be taxed if not exempt under federal or state law, and under applicable case law the right to use public rights-of-way is an assessable possessory interest in real property. Stanislaus County v. Assessment Appeals Board, 213 Cal.App.3d 1445; Shubat v. Sutter County Assessment Appeals Board, 13 Cal.App.4th 794.
Commercial use.—The exclusive and profitable use of public property for commercial rafting by a commercial rafting company constitutes a taxable possessory interest. The tax is on the company's use of the water, and the right to use water is a valuable property right upon which a possessory interest tax may be levied. Scott-Free River Expeditions, Inc. v. El Dorado County, 203 Cal.App.3d 896. The purpose of this section is to protect the public domain from private profit without tax liability. And use by commercial air passenger carriers of an international airport was business use and sufficiently exclusive as to qualify as a taxable possessory interest, even though the general aviation public had concurrent landing rights. United Air Lines, Inc. v. San Diego County, 1 Cal.App.4th 418. The possession or use which grounds possessory interests means and requires not just some benefit from the public property, but physical possession or use of it. Thus, the county assessment appeals board was correct in limiting taxable possessory interest assessments of several car rental firms at county airports to their counters and reserved parking lots rather than on their "use" of the airports as a whole. Further rights granted by the airports, to do business at the airports and their environs, were not possessory interests but were intangibles not subject to property tax. Los Angeles County v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board No. 1, 13 Cal.App.4th 102.
The owner of amusement machines placed for private profit in public facilities, including an airport terminal, meets the requirement of exclusiveness, and is therefore subject to a taxable possessory interest. Despite the small size and variable location of the space occupied by each machine, the owner had a special right of access for profit not shared in common by all who entered such facilities, and such space was not by its size or movement made unvaluable to the owner. Freeman v. Fresno County, 126 Cal.App.3d 459.
Short-term users of a city's facilities obtained taxable possessory interests in the facilities when they obtained use permits on more than one occasion. Two-time uses of the facilities meet the criteria of durability, independence, and exclusivity necessary to constitute possessory interests. And the agreement between the city and the users accorded sufficient control to the users to meet the criterion of independent possession. City of San Jose v. Carlson, 57 Cal.App.4th 1348.
Commercial Use.—The use of a space for a profit-making enterprise or other private benefit is an integral factor in establishing "independence." Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal.App.4th 552.
Term of possession.—A tenant's month-to-month tenancy was properly treated as a durable possessory interest in the property even though his lease could be terminated, as the tenant had possessed the property for several years. Although the possessory interest had no stated term of possession, the tenant had the same right to continued possession as any tenant who interest is subject to termination or renewal. Therefore, value could be ascribed to the expectation of continued possession of the property by the tenant. Silveira v. County of Alameda, 139 Cal.App.4th 989.
Month-to-month tenancy.—A tenant's month-to-month tenancy was properly treated as a durable possessory interest in the property even though his lease could be terminated, as the tenant had possessed the property for several years. Although the possessory interest had no stated term of possession, the tenant had the same right to continued possession as any tenant who interest is subject to termination or renewal. Therefore, value could be ascribed to the expectation of continued possession of the property by the tenant. Silveira v. County of Alameda, 139 Cal.App.4th 989.
Value.—Insofar as a county included the exempt reversionary interest pursuant to Government Code Section 7510, subdivision (b)(1) when the county assessed a commercial lessee's possessory interest under Revenue and Taxation Code Section 107 for property owned by a state public retirement system, the valuation methodology is facially unconstitutional because it violates California Constitution Article XIII, Section 3, subdivision (a), by assessing property tax on publicly-owned real property; further, the valuation methodology violates California Constitution Article XIII, Section 1, by assessing property in excess of its fair market value as defined in Revenue and Taxation Code Sections 110, subdivision (a), and 110.5. California State Teachers’ Retirement System v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 41.